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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Gendell v. Orr 3 8 held the existence of the building on a public high-
way for three years to be sufficient dedication to forfeit the common-
law copyright.3 9 Kurfiss v. Cowherd 40 held the public exhibition of
the building without restriction upon the right to measure and copy
was a publication.41
However, in deciding this issue, the Smith case has disregarded
the dedication and abandonment theories of the Gendell and Kurfiss
cases. In their stead it has extended the Apollo rule. The house,
the Court reasoned, was not a copy of the architectural plans and
therefore could not be a publication of them.42
The Apollo rule is not new to the area of copyright.43 However,
in the United States the courts have confined it to the area of musical
compositions and recordings. The Smith case is the first instance
of its application in the area of architectural plans. This has left
the door open for its further extension in the performance fields.
The requirement of a copy and its strict definition furnishes the
courts with a more solid criteria of publication than the traditional
abandonment and dedication concept. Armed with this, the fore-
warning of the Gendell case concerning the possible uselessness of
statutory copyright 44 may become reality in the performance areas.
)X
CORPORATIONS- POWER OF PRESIDENT TO INSTITUTE SUIT IN
THE CORPORATE NAME.-Defendant, a three-man corporation, con-
38 Ibid.
39 The court may have anticipated the Apollo holding and its effect on
statutory copyright when it pointed out: "Three years upon the highway
must certainly be regarded as an abandonment of any right, else the copyright
law . . . would become useless." Gendell v. Orr, supra note 37. (Emphasis
added.)
40 Supra note 36.
41 The building was a model home on exhibition. The court treated it much
the same as a painting exhibited in a gallery. Kurfiss v. Cowherd, supra
note 37, at 287. See note 17, supra.
42 Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App.2d 804, 345 P.2d 546, 553 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959). The court also indicated that the exhibition of a film, the performance
of a script, and the broadcast of a radio script are not copies. Id. at 553(dictum).
43 "The performance in public of a dramatic or musical work, and the
delivery in public of a lecture, are not publication of the work or lecture .
for obviously a performance is not an 'issue of copies' ....
"Neither is the exhibition in public of an artistic work or the construction
of an architectural work of art, publication of it." CoPiNGER, LAW OF
COPYRIGHi 36 (6th ed. 1927). The concept that publication requires an issu-
ance of copies is found in the United Kingdom's Copyright Act, 1911,
1 & 2 GEO. 5, c. 46, § 1(3). This concept is also found in Article VI of the
Universal Copyright Convention which defines publication as the reproduction
in tangible form and the general distribution to the public of copies of a work.
Universal Copyright Convention, 17 U.S.C. §9 (1958).
44 See note 39, supra.
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structed an apartment house. As sole directors and stockholders,
the three men agreed to make plaintiff corporation, a similar organ-
ization in which the same three men were sole stockholder-directors,
pay the $200,000 bill for work, labor, and services. By this move,
the house became the defendant corporation's asset while the stock
in plaintiff corporation was rendered worthless.
Zaubler, one of the three men, was president, and, along with the
other two, one-third stockholder and a director in both corporations.
He later sold his interest in several organizations, including the de-
fendant corporation, to the two remaining stockholders, but they did
not buy his one-third interest in plaintiff corporation since it now
had considerably lower value.
The two remaining men then decided to sell the apartment house
and divide all the assets of defendant corporation between them.
Zaubler, as president of plaintiff corporation, brought this action
against them as individual defendants, alleging that as directors of
plaintiff corporation they had mismanaged that corporation in forc-
ing it to pay for the labor for the house, and against the defendant
corporation to prevent the liquidation of its assets wrongfully received,
alleging that plaintiff corporation, in which he retained a third
interest, was rightfully entitled to the money. Zaubler predicated
his authority to bring the action on the implied powers of his presi-
dential office, and retained a New York attorney to prosecute the
action in the plaintiff corporation's name.
The Court of Appeals, affirming a judgment of the Appellate
Division, held that despite the lack of specific enumeration in the
charter or by-laws of the plaintiff corporation, the president under
the circumstances had the power to institute action in the corporate
name. West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344,
160 N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
Zaubler, as both president and minority stockholder, had two
possible avenues of approach open at the commencement of this ac-
tion. He could have brought either a presidential suit in the name
of the corporation, or a stockholder's derivative action.' There are
several reasons why a stockholder's derivative action would be un-
desirable to him.
In a derivative suit, the plaintiff must pay all legal fees and ex-
penses personally.2 He must also exhaust his remedies within the
'The obvious elements of acquiescence, ratification, and laches present
would put an individual minority representative action out of the picture.
2 Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 493,
84 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1949) ; La Vin v. La Vin, 281 App. Div. 888, 119 N.Y.S.2d
573, appeal denied, 281 App. Div. 984, 121 N.Y.S.2d 89 (2d Dep't 1953). A
successfid plaintiff in a derivative suit may, however, be awarded counsel fees
at the court's discretion and on a strict quantum ineruit basis. See BALLANTINE,
CoRPoRATioNs § 156 (rev. ed. 1946). See also Hornstein, Counsel Fees in
Stockholders Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. REv. 784, 786 (1939). N.Y. GEN.
CoRP. LAW §§ 61-a, 64-67.
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corporation. This entails a formal demand on the directors 3 and a
wrongful refusal not based on reasonable discretion. 4 A good-faith
decision not to sue by the directors acting in the business interest
would normally bar the action.5 The plaintiff's burden of proof must
not merely show an error of judgment on their part, but actual neg-
ligent, illegal, or fraudulent mismanagement 0 -a difficult undertaking.
In New York, there are also additional qualifications for the
plaintiff in a derivative suit. He must own the shares either when
the transaction complained of arose or they must have devolved upon
him by operation of law; 7 they must also be owned at the time of
the suit and during its continuance.8 He must also meet the statutory
requirements of stock ownership or value or else he may be required
to post bond for the corporation's legal expenses. 9
The derivative stockholder labors under a presumption that the
directors acted in the business interest '0 -there is no presumption of
legitimacy or authority to bring suit in his favor. Moreover, the
court can re-appoint counsel to represent all the stockholders if it
deems this expedient."
Other disadvantages to the plaintiff may be the intervention of
other stockholders against him,12 the imposition of a kind of fiduciary
obligation on him as plaintiff,'" the passive role played by the cor-
3 Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 265, 179 N.E. 487, 490 (1932). Where
the demand would be futile, it need not be made. Price v. Standard Oil Co.,
55 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 890, 77 N.Y.S.2d 686
(1st Dep't 1948).
, Mendelson Bros. Factors v. Sachs, 253 App. Div. 270, 1 N.Y.S.2d 838(1st Dep't), aff'd, 279 N.Y. 604, 17 N.E.2d 459 (1938); Smith v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 276 App. Div. 210, 93 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd,
302 N.Y. 683, 98 N.E.2d 482 (1951); Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465, 66
N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1946), motion for leave to appeal dismissed, 271 App.
Div. 823, 66 N.Y.S.2d 618, aff'd mer., 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562 (1947).
Some authorities hold, in addition, that the exhaustion of corporate remedies
must include an application to other stockholders as a body, and an attempt
to convene a meeting to ratify the suit or vote new directors. See BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 146 (rev. ed. 1946) and cases cited therein.
5Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E.2d 883 (1937); Hornstein
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y.
468, 55 N.E.2d 740 (1944).
6 J.C.F. Holding Corp. v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 181 Misc. 283,
46 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd vzom., 267 App. Div. 863, 47 N.Y.S.2d
303 (1st Dep't 1944).
7 N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 61.
8 Hanna v. Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 778 (1904). See also BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 148 (rev. ed. 1946). For the rule in the federal courts, see
Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941), and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
9 N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 61-b.
10 See cases cited notes 4 and 6 supra and BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 8,
§ 147.
11 Fleitman v. Simpson, 9 Misc.2d 398, 166 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct., 1957).
12 See Fleitman v. Simpson, sup-ra note 11; Mathews v. American Tobacco
Co., 130 N.J. Eq. 470, 23 A.2d 301 (1941). Cf. N.Y. CIv. PaAc. AcT § 193-b (2).
'1 Koster v. American Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 145 (rev. ed. 1946).
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poration against him,14 and the possible lack of a jury trial.15  The
minority stockholder is also subject to a judicial suspicion of his suit
as a possible strike suit brought for harassment or nuisance value, to
further his own economic interests, or to gain control.' 6
The substantive area would also present formidable obstacles to
a derivative action in this case. Although the instant case was not
decided on the merits, it is highly probable that, had it been brought
as a minority derivative suit, it would have failed on the grounds




Finally, an unfavorable aura would surround Zaubler as a
minority stockholder; his interests would be more obvious than in a
presidential suit brought ostensibly in the business interest.
Zaubler's other avenue was to institute, as president, a suit in
the name of plaintiff corporation. The source of power to bring suit
in the corporate name is ordinarily associated with and exercised by
the board of directors in managing the corporation.22 The power to
bring suit may, however, be delegated to the president. This may
be accomplished expressly in the corporate charter or by-laws, or by
'4 -all v. Crailo Sweets, 177 Misc. 120, 29 N.Y.S.2d 381 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
inen., 262 App. Div. 866, 29 N.Y.S.2d 512 (2d Dep't 1941).
- Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 84
N.E.2d 790 (1949). The stockholder's derivative action is one in equity.
Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 NE.2d 883 (1937); Fanchon & Marco
v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
16 See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
17 The dissent in the Court of Appeals assumed that Zaubler would be
estopped in a derivative action. West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp.,
6 N.Y.2d 344, 351, 160 N.E.2d 622, 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion).
Is Cf. Goldboss v. Reimann, 55 F. Supp. 811, aff'd nzem., 143 F.2d 594
(2d Cir. 1944). This case held that a shareholder's prejudicial delay in bring-
ing suit barred a derivative action. "Laches is perhaps the most common and
effective defense against a derivative suit by a minority shareholder."
BAILANTINE, Coazoiwriows § 151 (rev. ed. 1946).
19 See Atkinson v. McCabe Hanger Mfg. Co., 55 N.Y.S2d 274 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
20 Quintal v. Kellner, 264 N.Y. 32, 189 N.E. 770 (1934). Here, stockholder
acquiescence was held to bar a derivative action.2 1 N .Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 48, 48-8. The instant case presents an interesting
and intricate problem in applying the statute of limitations. The precise
nature of the action against the defendant corporation was not stated; but
the action against the directors would have failed in mismanagement, negli-
gence, waste, injury, or any other usual form of this type of suit. Ibid. The
shorter statute is applied to the derivative stockholder rather than the longer
equity statute. Cf. Potter v. Walker, 276 N.Y. 15, 11 N.E.2d 335 (1937).
See also PRAsHxKR, NEW YORK PRAcrmcE §§ 27, 28c (4th ed., 1959). Section
48 of the Civil Practice Act (an action based on the fraud of the directors
and defendant corporation) is apparently inapplicable because of Zaubler's
original acquiescence and the prolonged inactivity of the corporation.
22 See N.Y. GE. CoRP. LAW § 27.
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agreement; 2 implicitly, through a past course of conduct by the
president with the acquiescence of the board; 24 or through the ap-
parent authority vested in the president in the eyes of an outsider. 25
Where the power has not been delegated to the president by the
board, there is a conflict of authority in New York as to whether or
not the president has an inherent power ex officio to bring suit in the
corporate name.26  While other jurisdictions say that he has the
power to institute and defend normal litigation,27 the case law in
New York up to this point was apparently settled by Sterling In-
dustries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp.,28 which held that the presi-
dent had no presumptive power at all.
29
Other holdings, however, had intimated that the power might be
implied when certain elements are present.30  Whether the courts
meant an implied delegation or a presumption of power is debatable.
The issue of the president's power usually arises in cases of deadlock
indicating a paralyzation of corporate management.3 1 The Court of
23 Matter of Paloma Frocks, 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d
509 (1958) (agreement to arbitrate) ; Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 263
N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933). See Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, 2
N.Y.2d 493, 499, 141 N.E.2d 610, 613, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118, 122 (1957). But
see Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adman, 4 App. Div.2d 619, 168 N.Y.S.2d 448
(1st Dep't), affd mem., 4 App. Div.2d 709, 164 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1957).
Where the president has acted for the corporation in the past, by handling its
business or bringing suits in its name, the board of directors would be estopped
from denying his authority now. See Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co.,
supra. This is the doctrine of habitual presidential control and no such analogous
doctrine protects the derivative stockholder.2 4 Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, supra note 23, at 498, 141 N.E.2d
at 613, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 121. See also Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co.,
supra note 23; N.Y. STocK CoRP. LAw § 60.
25 Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 490,
84 N.E.2d 790, 792-93 (1949). See also West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau
Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 349, 160 N.E.2d 622, 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867
(1959) (dissenting opinion).
26 Compare Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., supra note
25, tuith West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 160
N.E.2d 622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959). "The merry-go-round of the corporate
president's power to institute legal action in the corporate name still spins;
and dizzily !" Prunty, Business Associatims, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1425, 1432
(1959).
27 Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731, 733 (2d
Cir. 1953). Cf. Hardin v. Morgan Lithograph Co., 247 N.Y. 332, 160 N.E.
388 (1928) (president has power to make ordinary contracts for his
corporation).
28298 N.Y. 483, 84 N.E.2d 790 (1949).
29 Id. at 490, 84 N.E.2d at 792.
30 See Twyeffort v. Unexcelled Mfg. Co., 263 N.Y. 6, 188 N.E. 138 (1933):
Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161
N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957). See also Tidy-House Paper Co. v. Adlman, 4 App.
Div.2d 619, 168 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1st Dep't), aff'd mnem., 4 App. Div.2d 709, 164
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1957).
31 See, e.g., Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., supra note
28; Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, supra note 30; Matter of Paloma
Frocks, 3 N.Y.2d 572, 147 N.E.2d 779, 170 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1958). See also
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Appeals further suggested that there must be an urgent necessity to
bring the suit.3 2  The third and perhaps most constant element in
all the cases dealing with the president's power has been the neces-
sity of a lack of direct prohibition by the board.
3 3
The New York case law can be represented by the views of
Sterling at one extreme, presuming no power at all; the instant case
at the other extreme, presuming the power in all cases of necessity;
and the large area in between, construing the presence, absence, and
necessity of the various elements. It is in the necessity of these
elements that the confusion lies. The Court of Appeals had not said
which of the elements is controlling, or indeed, whether one element
alone will suffice or whether some or all must be present conjunctively
to sustain the power.
Perhaps the most important change in the court's policy as
enunciated in the Sterling case is the present holding that the presi-
dent has the presumptive authority to bring suit in the corporate
name. By presuming that the president has a separate and inde-
pendent source of power to bring suit, the Court has effectively ruled
out at least two of the three previously necessary elements. In
the instant case there was no sign of deadlock, indecision, or para-
lyzation.3 4 In the future, corporation presidents may therefore inter-
vene, in the absence of these elements, against the wishes of the
majority of the board.
Secondly, the Court justified the suit on the grounds of its mere
necessity to protect and preserve the corporate interest.3 5 The ele-
ment of urgency has been lost.3 6 It may therefore be argued that
every corporate suit is to preserve and protect the corporate interest,
and the president is permitted by the instant case to bring suit at
any time on the justification that it is for the corporate interest.
Another important difference can be seen in the Court's changing
attitude toward the presence of the third element-the necessity of a
lack of direct prohibition by the board. The problem of construing
the "direct prohibition" of the directors in a small, close corporation
was met in Sterling by equating their deadlock with a refusal, the
West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 349, 160 N.E.2d
622, 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
32 See Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., Mipra, note 28,
at 492, 84 N.E.2d at 794.
33 See Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, supra note 30, at 497, 141 N.E.2d
at 613.34 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 347, 160
N.E.2d 622, 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (1959).
35 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 34, at 346, 160
N.E.2d at 623, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
36 Compare Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y.
483, 492, 84 N.E.2d 790, 794 (1949), with West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau
Realty Corp., supra note 34, at 346, 160 N.E.2d at 623, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
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court interpreting "direct refusal" broadly.3' In the principal case,
however, the Court interpreted "direct refusal" strictly and held that
even though the directors were obviously opposed to the suit and
would have refused had they been asked, the suit was properly
brought since they had not been asked and therefore did not directly
prohibit the suit.38
Once the power of the president to bring suit has been settled
affirmatively, the courts have treated the presidential suit itself, in
every other aspect, as identical to the usual suit by the corporation
and its management. It possesses all the characteristics of the di-
rectors' action, is open to the same defenses, and goes on just as if
it had been brought by the directors as a normal management suit-
it is truly a suit in the corporate name. 9
In the instant case the majority held that the president's power
was properly presumed in the circumstances, which amounted to
"situations requiring the exercise of such power to preserve and pro-
tect the interests of the corporation" 40 despite the absence of the
usual elements, deadlock, indecision, and urgent or compelling neces-
sity from which the power is implied.41
37 Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., supra note 36, at 490,
84 N.E.2d at 793. See also Tidy-House Paper Co. v. Adlman, 4 App. Div2d
619, 168 N.Y.S.2d 448, aff'd mein., 4 App. Div.2d 709, 164 N.Y.S.2d 1005(1st Dep't 1957).38 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 34, at 349-50,
160 N.E.2d at 625-26, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68 (dissenting opinion). In a
small corporation, the necessity for a direct demand, refusal and prohibition
by the board has been commented on as an intolerable formality where the
board is obviously, or will obviously be opposed to the suit and the president
knows it. See Prunty, Business Associations, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1425, 1433(1959). See also Tidy-House Paper Co. v. Adlman, supra note 37, at 621,
168 N.Y.S.2d at 449. Cotra, Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d
493, 141 N.E.2d 610, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957). Sound reason seems to sup-
port the dissent's view in the instant case that the circumstances are equivalent
to a direct prohibition. See Prunty, Bu siness Associations, 34 N.Y.U.L. RFv.
1425, 1433-34 (1959).39 The immediate substantive and procedural advantages of the presidential
suit over a stockholders' derivative suit in the instant case are obvious. The
corporation, not Zaubler, pays the legal fees, expenses, and court costs. There
are no requirements of exhaustion of remedies, no necessity of formal demand
or wrongful refusal to sue, no derivative stockholder qualifications to meet.
A prior burden of proof is put on the defendants to disprove the president's
authority to act; the corporation and management acting for its interest are
behind him rather than passively interested, and he may get a jury trial.
The discretionary power of the president's office would also be an effective
vehicle for cloaking ratification and acquiescence. See notes 2-21 supra; see
generally BALLANTINE, CORPORAnIONS § 51 (rev. ed. 1946).
40 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 346, 160
N.E.2d 622, 623, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (1959).
41 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 160 N.E.2d
622, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863 (1959).
RECENT DECISIONS
The dissents in both the lower ' and higher 43 courts felt that
the power could not be implied because there was no deadlock, in-
decision, urgency, or present necessity. Both dissents further rea-
soned that the obvious desire of the directors under the circumstances
not to bring suit, which was known to the president, amounted to
a direct prohibition.44
Although Zaubler had alleged that the defendants were protect-
ing their "selfish interests," the dissent in the higher court realized
that he, too, was effectively hiding his own selfish minority interests
behind the president's cloak of authority, intimating that he had
brought the suit purely for its strategic value in furthering these in-
terests, disguising the action as a management suit which should have
been brought over four years ago.45
The difference in attitude between the two opinions is remark-
able. The majority, preserving the corporate entity theory, reasoned
that the corporation itself had a cause of action 46 which could not be
prejudiced by the fact that all those who made up the corporation-
directors, president, and every last stockholder-participated in the
fraud. The dissent pierced the corporate veil to look at the real
parties in interest and reasoned that Zaubler should be estopped from
accomplishing as president that which he could not do as a minority
stockholder.47
The dissent's peek under the corporate facade, besides revealing
Zaubler's prejudicial minority interests and changing the entire com-
plexion of the case, is representative of a growing tendency of sev-
eral courts to treat small, close corporations as partnerships. 8 By
treating these "partnership corporations" no better than the parties
themselves treat them, not as entities but as facades, the courts have
remitted the parties in justice to the consequences of their own
dealings.
The instant case seems to be an encroachment on the powers
of directors to manage a corporation and a violation of the court's
42 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 App. Div2d 844, 845,
175 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (1st Dep't 1958) (memorandum decision) (dissenting
opinion).
43 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 41, at 348, 160
N.E2d at 625, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 866 (dissenting opinion).44 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra notes 41 and 42.
45 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 41, at 350-51,
160 N.E.2d at 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 867-68 (dissenting opinion).
46 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 347, 160
N.E.2d 622, 624, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865 (1959).
47 West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., supra note 46, at 350, 160
N.E.2d at 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (dissenting opinion).
48 See, e.g., Rothman & Schneider v. Beckerman, 2 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 141
N.E.2d 610, 614, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118, 122 (1957); Helms v. Duckworth, 249
F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Prunty, Business Associations, 34
-N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 1425, 1434 (1959).
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policy as enunciated in the Sterling case. 49  By encouraging presi-
dents to intervene in the running of a corporation on spurious pre-
texts or to further their "coincidental" minority interests, the sta-
bility and management of corporations is jeopardized.
No set rule can be formulated where the president is a minority
stockholder, 50 nor can the courts disregard the corporate entity theory
without good reason. The proper approach should be similar to that
used by the dissent in this case. The courts should begin to abandon
their traditional reluctance to disregard the entity theory, and look
at the actions of the individual parties and their interests and mo-
tives as conflicting with or ignoring the legitimate interests of the
corporation they have created. 51 This should include a thorough
investigation of why a president holding sizable minority stock would
have failed in a derivative action or why it would have been other-
wise undesirable to bring it. Where the suit is obviously to further
primarily the president's personal interests, the courts should not
hesitate to relegate him to whatever rights he may properly have as
a derivative or representative shareholder.
5 2
In the alternative, where all the stockholders and directors-in
fact, the entire corporation, has participated in an internal fraud,
-9 "We have consistently held that section 27 of the General Corporation
law, which provides that the business of a corporation shall be managed by
its board of directors, cannot be circumvented." Sterling Industries, Inc.
v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 298 N.Y. 483, 492, 84 N.E.2d 790, 793-94 (1949).
50 Since every corporation president in New York owns some stock, the
difference between a strike suit to further minority interests and an act of
legitimate presidential interference is properly one of degree depending ulti-
mately on the facts and circumstances of each individual case. The New York
courts have been content thus far to say merely: "One side should not be
entitled to maintain an action in the name and at the expense of the cor-
poration simply because the president happens to be allied with its interests."
Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., 273 App. Div. 460, 469,
77 N.Y.S.2d 691, 699 (1st Dep't 1948) (dissenting opinion).
51 Thus, the substantive and procedural elements of the present case seem
to reinforce the dissent's picture of this action by Zaubler as a well-concealed
minority strike suit brought purely for his own personal selfish interest. See
West View Hills, Inc. v. Lizau Realty Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 344, 351, 160 N.E.2d
622, 626, 189 N.Y.S.2d 863, 868 (1959) (dissenting opinion). Zaubler, having
asserted his authority, is now in an excellent position to sell his previously
worthless stock in the plaintiff corporation to the defendants, or, upon re-
covery, to "siphon" the money over to the plaintiff corporation in which he
retains a one-third interest. Ibd. The Court, by its "unbelievably naive"
adherance to the entity theory (cf. Prunty, Bishess Associations, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1425, 1433 (1959)), has actually placed Zaubler in a position whereby he
stands to profit personally from his own questionable dealings in the past
with West View Hills, Inc.
52 See Tidy-House Paper Corp. v. Adlman, 4 App. Div.2d 619, 168 N.Y.S.2d
448, (1st Dep't), aff'd wtem., 4 App. Div.2d 709, 164 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't
1957; Sterling Industries, Inc. v. Ball Bearing Pen Corp., szpra note 49. Compare
Kardwheel Corp. v. Karper, 1 Misc.2d 707, 148 N.Y.S.2d 132 (Sun. Ct. 1956)
(suit by officers in name of corporation dismissed), with Cole Steel Equip.
Co. v. Kardwheel Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (derivative suit
instituted by same officers permitted).
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such considerations should be admissible against the corporation in
a presidential action at the court's discretion.63
M
COURTS - FEDERAL JURISDICTION - LIMITs ON DISCRETION OF
DISTRICT COURT IN DIVERSITY CASE RELATING TO PROBATE AND
ADMINISTRATION.- Plaintiff, beneficiary of a testamentary trust,
brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District
of New York, seeking, inter alia, damages for breach of trust and a
construction of the will of the testatrix to declare plaintiff the owner
of certain stock. The district court declined jurisdiction although
there was diversity of citizenship. In reversing in part and affirming
in part the order of the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that while the district court was correct in dis-
avowing jurisdiction over part of plaintiff's claim, it had no discretion
to decline jurisdiction of those claims of plaintiff that would not
interfere with the previously attached quasi in rem jurisdiction of the
state surrogate's court, notwithstanding the fact that the estate was
still in administration. Beach v. Rome Trust Co., 269 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1959).
Plaintiff's complaint in the case presented an opportunity for
the Court to consider many of the problems of federal jurisdiction
over claims against decedents' estates, i.e., to what extent do federal
courts, sitting in equity, have subject matter jurisdiction over such
matters, the effect of state law on such jurisdiction and the discre-
tionary power of the federal court to decline the exercise of juris-
diction otherwise existing. Actions in federal courts affecting
decedents' estates present jurisdictional questions in more than one
sense of that term. A district court's jurisdiction is both defined
and limited by the statute that grants it.1 Also in entertaining ac-
tions against executors and administrators the district court is sitting
as a court of equity, and the considerations that govern equity's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction apply.2 Finally, in the area under discussion,
the jurisdiction of the federal court is limited by the principles of
comity which obtain when courts of concurrent jurisdiction entertain
actions respecting the same subject matter.3
53 Cf. Tidy-House Paper Co. v. Adlman, supra note 52. A final considera-
tion is that the use of the presidential suit by unscrupulous presidents may
lead, as in the case of minority stockholders' suits, to oppressive legislation
which would make legitimate and sincere presidential interference difficult.
"Actions based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958),
constitute the bulk of litigation that will be considered.
2 See generally Case of Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1874).
3 See 1 MooaR, FEDERAL PRAcncE 0.222 (2d ed. 1959).
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